[In continuation of a previous post…]
Let:
x = “you are looking in the correct place”.
y = “you are finding what you are looking for”.
P = “probably”.
Then B’s answer in dialogue 1 (D1) could, in a first attempt, be literally translated to:
S1) P[(not x) implies (not y)]
And in dialogue 2 (D2), it could be literally translated to:
S2) P[(not x)] implies (not y)
It is kind of absurd that B might really want to mean S2 in his answer in D2, for the reasons pointed out by Harald in his comment: it doesn’t make much sense to state that the mere probability of looking in the wrong place would cause the certain impossibility of finding what it is being searched.
On the other hand, S1 is pragmatically strange. It says that it is only probable that looking in the wrong place will prevent finding what is being looked for. But this is more like a sure common sense fact to me. The statement of S1 by B gives no information to A. In fact, even if B had stated “that’s because you are looking in the wrong place”, which would literally translate as:
S1’) (not x) implies (not y)
still no information is given to A, since S1’ is already known by A (for a smart enough A).
This shows that there is an issue with interpreting “because” as implication. A second attempt might involve B trying to mean:
S3) P[(not x)] and ((not x) implies (not y))
In this case, “F1 because F2” seems to be more correctly interpreted as an abbreviation for “F2 and (F2 implies F1)”. But then we still have the issue with the “probably” modality, as D1 would lead to:
S1’’) P[(not x) and ((not x) implies (not y))]
and D2 would lead to:
S2’’) P[(not x)] and (P[(not x)] implies (not y))
Neither of these is exactly S3, although both come very close, and that might be the source of the difficulty to choose between D1 and D2, if we were B.
S1, S2, S1’, S3, S1’’ and S2’’ all have a common feature: they try to encode B’s answer as a statement that will give A some information. But if this were really the point of the dialogue, B could be as informative and much more concise by simply replying:
“you are probably looking in the wrong place”
S4) P[(not x)]
So, why does B choose to be more verbose and make a more complicated linguistic construction involving “because”?
Here is a (very speculative) answer: B is not trying to communicate a simple statement encodable as a logical formula; he is trying to communicate a whole explanation, which is more properly encodable as a proof! A’s statement in the beginning of the dialogue prompts B to help A in constructing an explanation for A’s statement. This “explanatory mode of conversation” is what recommends B to use the construction involving “because”. It is therefore more appropriate to think of “because” as an inference in a proof than as a connective in a formula.
“F1 because F2” is communicating the existence of a trivial proof of F1 from the assumption F2.
“F1 probably because F2” is communicating the probable existence of a proof… The uncertainty is in the level of the proof.
Interestingly, logics that deal with uncertainty usually consider uncertainty only in the level of formulas, but not in the level of proofs. And works on the semantics of natural language are usually trying to translate natural language sentences to formulas, but not to proofs. So, this (yet speculative) approach opens new doors to lots of work to be done…